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Managers have often used tournament incentive programs because of their ability to attract top 
talent and motivate employees to give their best effort (Grote 2005; McGregor 2006; Ng and 
Lublin 2010). However, because a tournament incentive structure explicitly evokes competition, 
prior economic literature has shown that the harmful effects of sabotage observed during a 
tournament can completely negate any benefits they have (Carpenter et al. 2010). The remedies 
suggested to reduce sabotage involve reducing the economic incentives that contribute to both 
beneficial and harmful behavior (Chen 2003). In the accounting literature to date, no remedy for 
the harmful effects of a tournament incentive has been investigated because the ability to 
sabotage has been restricted by way of tight experimental control. I utilize an experiment in 
which participants perform a real effort task which allows them to sabotage each other and 
receive relative performance feedback in real-time. I first predict that sabotage during a 
tournament will be higher than fixed pay because of the higher incentive to sabotage during a 
tournament. I then predict that by employing a code of ethics, I can activate the social norm of 
promise keeping which discourages those in a tournament from engaging in sabotage, while still 
giving their best effort. In the majority of cases, this allows the company to reap the previously 
observed benefits of a tournament incentive, while minimizing the previously observed costs that 
normally accompany a tournament incentive. However, I unexpectedly discover that a code of 
ethics can be able double-edge sword; In so much that, if violations persist despite certifications 
to follow the code, participants may become more discouraged and their behavior more 
detrimentally effects productivity than if those same violations occurred without a code. The 
implications of employing a code of ethics under these two incentive systems on overall 
productivity is explored.  
Keywords: sabotage; tournament; code of ethics; social norm activation.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 A rank-order tournament compensation scheme is one in which the pay, promotion, or 
prize depends on an individual’s ordinal rank in the organization rather than his output level 
(Lazear and Rosen 1981a). Managers have often used tournament incentive programs because of 
their ability to attract top talent and motivate employees to give their best effort (Grote 2005; 
McGregor 2006; Ng and Lublin 2010). Tournaments help reduce the common uncertainty 
between employee effort and observable output by comparing employees to their peers, rather 
than tying compensation to a discrete measure of output (Lazear and Rosen 1979). This may 
reduce the required risk premium demanded by employees, which combined with their higher 
effort may lead to greater profits for the firm (Prendergast 1999). However, because the incentive 
structure explicitly evokes competition, employees may be reluctant to cooperate and might even 
engage in strategic behavior such as sabotage (Lazear 1989; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011; Dato 
and Nieken 2014), excessive risk taking (Hannan et al. 2008) or other behavior that is 
incongruent with firm goals (Charness et al. 2014). For example, members of a sales division 
might not only refuse to share leads with or give advice to their colleagues, but also might poach 
clients or subvert client relationships while in a tournament. In addition, those who feel that 
victory is unattainable may simply become disheartened, “give up” and provide less effort than 
they would otherwise (Berger et al. 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014). For this reason, 
companies may be reluctant to use tournament incentive programs when they need to motivate a 
large group of employees to not only give more effort, but also engage in sharing and 
cooperation. This study examines whether a combination of economic incentives and social 
norms can motivate employees to give their best effort without resorting to harmful strategic 
behavior like sabotage.  
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 Because only relative performance matters in a tournament, sabotage, rather than fidelity, 
may better serve the employee’s interests. This means that under a tournament incentive scheme 
overall productivity may suffer because employees are willing to sabotage each other in order to 
win the tournament prize (Chen 2003; Münster 2007; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005). This 
economic incentive for employees to engage in sabotage under a tournament incentive scheme 
may prove so detrimental to an employer’s bottom line that they would have been better off 
utilizing a flat wage or piece rate incentive (Carpenter et al. 2010). Researchers in the economics 
and management literature have proposed several remedies to reduce sabotage from promotion 
based on seniority (Chen 2003) or a reduction in the prize spread (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005) 
to gender quotas (Dato and Nieken 2014). Although they may reduce sabotage, previously 
proposed solutions may be costly and could reduce the benefits previously observed under a 
tournament incentive. I propose a different solution. Instead of adjusting formal controls by 
tweaking economic incentives, managers can rely on an informal control. They can utilize social 
norms by presenting the employees an opportunity to agree to a code of ethics that specifically 
condemns sabotage. 
 Recent accounting research has illustrated that getting employees to internalize to a code 
of ethics may activate social norms that can discourage undesirable behavior. By utilizing 
Bicchieri’s (2006) model of social norm activation Davidson and Stevens (2013) predict and find 
that if managers publicly certify a code of ethics, both manager return behavior and investor 
confidence increase. If activating social norms discourages those in a tournament incentive 
program from engaging in sabotage while still giving their best effort, it may be possible for 
managers to get the “best of both worlds”. In addition, those who would have been discouraged 
by sabotage and otherwise given up in a tournament might be encouraged to continue. Using 
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Bicchieri’s model in this study allows for relevant and verifiable predictions. Therefore, instead 
of simply reporting behavior that departs from traditional economic self-interest, this study helps 
us understand what drives such behavior.  
 Sabotage has been studied in economics and management and has been acknowledged as 
a problem in accounting (Bol and Lill 2015), but the ability to engage in such behavior has 
largely been controlled in experimental accounting studies. By allowing employees to personally 
gain at the expense of one another, I specifically examine a very attractive form of sabotage: 
overtly stealing credit from fellow employees. This often takes place in the workplace and can 
affect raises and promotion decisions (Uzzi and Dunlap 2012; Dillon 2014). I chose to study this 
attractive form of sabotage because any remedy I found would also presumably work on less 
attractive, more self-destructive forms of sabotage. I make two theoretical predictions. First, 
based on the economic incentives present in a tournament and the results of prior experimental 
studies, I predict that sabotage will be higher under a tournament incentive than a flat wage 
incentive. Second, if participants first certify a code of ethics that discourages sabotage, I predict 
an interaction will occur whereby the decrease in sabotage will be highest under a tournament 
incentive. This prediction is based on the expectation that the certification of the code of ethics 
activates social norms, such as promise keeping, which lead to a decrease in sabotage. This 
decrease will be highest under a tournament because it’s easier to rationalize bad behavior (and 
thus evade the norm) under a flat wage compensation because (unlike under a tournament) 
sabotage doesn’t lead to economic harm. Finally, I explore interactive effects of incentive type 
and code of ethics certification on overall productivity.  
 I ran an experiment with a 2x2 between-subjects factorial design (with repeated periods). 
I manipulated the presence or absence of a code of ethics (that condemns sabotage) and the type 
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of incentive compensation used (tournament / flat wage) to examine their effects on individual 
employee behavior and overall firm productivity. Groups of three participants engage in a real 
effort task entitled Stamp Out!, a task featured in the videogame Mario Party 4 (Nintendo 2002). 
Each of the three active participants simultaneously attempts to “paint” as much of single large 
canvas as they can in 30 seconds. Each participant controls a “stamp” with a unique color that 
begins the round at a different part of the canvas. When the timer starts, all participants can 
witness each other’s activity in real-time while a countdown timer is displayed at the top of the 
screen. If they choose, participants have the ability to benefit from sabotage by painting over a 
section of the canvas that has already been covered with another participant’s unique color. At 
the end of a 30 second round, each participant is shown what percentage of the total canvas has 
been covered in their unique color. Participants are compensated based on a rank order or a flat 
wage. Participants repeat the activity for ten rounds and then answer a post-experimental 
questionnaire.  
 The results of the experiment support my two predictions, that sabotage is more likely to 
occur during a tournament and that a code of ethics would lead to the greatest reduction in 
sabotage during a tournament. However, I find that employing a code of ethics during a 
tournament might not always be best for productivity. Although, in the majority of cases 
certifying a code of ethics nearly eliminated sabotage entirely, which led to high productivity, in 
the few cases in which sabotage occurred despite a code of ethics the other participants were so 
discouraged they appeared to give up entirely.  
 The study makes several contributions to the accounting literature. First, because I 
utilized a real effort task that “involves effort, fatigue, boredom, excitement and other 
affectations not present” in chosen effort (van Dijk et al. 2001, 189),  I was able to capture 
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behavior and gain insights that may not have been possible had I followed the traditional method 
of using a turn-based effort choice task. I also discovered a relatively low cost way to reduce 
sabotage and that was shown to be effective in environments where sabotage was most likely to 
occur. In addition, I might be able to shed some light on how the effectiveness of different 
compensation schemes (like those presented in Hannan et al (2008) and Tafkov (2013) compare 
when given timely relative performance feedback and sabotage is allowed. I also extend prior 
literature by further exploring the underlying mechanisms that manage Bicchieri’s model of 
social norm activation. 
 This study also has potential implications for practice by providing management with 
insight into how to practically design and implement an incentive system. Although acts of overt 
sabotage, like stealing ideas or taking credit for the work of others can happen in even the most 
cohesive and familial environments, the game-like nature of the environment used in this study 
most closely matches workplace environments that highly prize individual achievement and focus 
workplace monitoring on the results rather than the mechanisms of employee behavior. Specific 
examples may include that of a Car Sales Consultant who have been described as working in a 
“cut-throat environment”, which may contribute to the 72% annual turnover rate (NADA 2015). 
The fact that sabotage was affected at all, in an environment where there were such strong 
economic and social incentives that encourage unethical behavior toward fellow employees, 
speaks to the potential power of this relatively simple remedy. However, this study also sheds light 
on the fact that while employing a code of ethics can be an economical and effective tool; I find it 
possible that it can also be a double-edged sword if its efficacy is not monitored.  
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 In the next section, I give a short review of the relevant literature and develop my 
hypothesis. In Section III, I describe my experimental design. In Section IV, I present my results. 
In Section V, I conclude. 
 II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Tournaments 
 Lazear and Rosen (1981) present an early formal theoretical model for behavior in rank-
order tournaments. In their model, output is observable and input is not. Output is described as a 
function of both effort and noise, such that: Output = Effort + Noise. Noise consists of both 
common environmental factors and individual idiosyncratic factors that are beyond the control of 
the employee. Because employees are assumed to be risk averse, they demand a risk premium 
under a piece-rate contract (Lazear and Rosen 1981a). However, under a tournament incentive 
scheme where employees are rewarded based on relative rank, the common environmental risk is 
shared by all employees. This largely reduces the need for a risk premium because pay would be 
independent of these common environmental factors (Hannan et al. 2008). Assuming that there 
isn’t a large disparity in skill level among the employees, tournaments are generally regarded as 
a suitable means to increase effort and performance (Lazear and Rosen 1981a).  
 Tournaments are largely observed in practice with prizes ranging from a simple 
promotion to large cash bonuses or extravagant vacation packages (Casas-Arce and Martínez-
Jerez 2009; Backes‐Gellner and Pull 2013). Over half of US companies utilize some form of a 
tournament incentive scheme, which leads some employees to add value to the firm (McGregor 
2006). However, because a tournament incentive explicitly evokes competition, some employees 
might engage in counter-productive strategic behavior such as a sabotage (Lazear 1989; Harbring 
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and Irlenbusch 2011; Dato and Nieken 2014), excessive risk taking (Hannan et al. 2008) or other 
behavior that is incongruent with firm goals (Charness et al. 2014). 
 
Sabotage 
 In this study, I examine one of the most attractive forms of sabotage: overtly stealing 
from fellow employees. This form of sabotage is attractive because the saboteur directly benefits 
in absolute terms as well as in relative terms. Overtly stealing credit for a fellow employee’s idea 
or past effort can even be used when competition among fellow employees isn’t very salient, 
such as when the reward is a simple praise from a superior or increases the possibility of a 
promotion (Dillon 2014). Many times this type of sabotage is hard to guard against, especially 
during collaborative work where management doesn’t have the will and/or resources to know 
who did what (Uzzi and Dunlap 2012). It may also be hard to combat because it could be 
engrained in workplace culture such as when union leaders commandeer money-saving 
workplace improvements from low-level union members, pass them onto management, and 
collect the reward for themselves (Gupta and Singhal 1993).   
 However, not all forms of sabotage benefit the saboteur, in absolute terms (Crino 1994, 
312) defined workplace sabotage as behavior intended to “damage, disrupt, or subvert the 
operations for the personal purposes of the saboteur by creating unfavorable publicity, 
embarrassment, delays in production, damage to property, the destruction of working 
relationships, or the harming of employees or customers”. Other examples of sabotage can range 
from gossip and bullying to theft or destruction of files or equipment (Sprouse and Illustrator-
Cox 1992; Jeter and Nursing 2010; Maher 2010). Additionally, motivations behind sabotage can 
vary from social injustice to simple economic incentives and can be targeted at either individuals 
or the organization itself (Analoui 1995; Ambrose et al. 2002). Workplace sabotage can 
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adversely affect not only the physical and psychological health of one or more individuals, but 
also the overall productivity and financial health of the organization as a whole (Jeter and 
Nursing 2010). Because of its impact and prevalence in the modern workforce, sabotage is 
considered an important subject of examination by researchers in both economics and 
management.  
 Using an economic model, Chen (2003) illustrated that employees in competition for 
promotion (a type of rank-order tournament) would generally focus their sabotage on the 
member with the greatest ability. As an old Japanese proverb says, “the nail that sticks out gets 
hammered” (Okada 1955, 28). This not only leads to productive inefficiencies, but also decreases 
the chance that the most competent employees get promoted (Chen 2003). This phenomenon has 
since been observed in subsequent experimental studies (Münster 2007; Carpenter et al. 2010). 
In fact, when sabotage was allowed within a tournament incentive scheme, the advantages 
previously observed over a piece rate scheme were lost (Carpenter et al. 2010).  
 Prior economic research has also shown that certain factors can moderate the amount of 
sabotage in a tournament. A handful of experiments have found that sabotage increases as the 
prize spread in the tournament increases and serve as a reminder of the power of traditional 
explicit economic incentives (Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008; 
Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011). Researchers have also observed this phenomenon in practice. del 
Corral et al. (2010) observed that an increase in the points awarded for a victory in fútbol 
tournament play affected the incidence of fouls, penalty cards, and the number of defensive 
players on the roster (del Corral et al. 2010). However, a more recent study highlights that 
implicit nonmonetary factors can also motivate individuals to engage in sabotage (Charness et al. 
2014). Charness et al. (2014) placed participants into groups of three and gave them a flat wage 
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to work on a decoding task. Simply providing relative performance information motivated the 
participants to invest in costly sabotage in order to improve their relative position in the group. 
The results of their study suggest that economic incentives are not necessary to persuade 
individuals to engage in sabotage. The status achieved through simple social comparison would 
be enough to motivate the participants to engage in sabotage, even if the task doesn’t require any 
particular skill or talent.  
 Another set of studies imply that companies may not need to add any economic or social 
incentives in order to encourage sabotage (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009; Abbink and Herrmann 
2011). In these studies, two players are endowed with an equal amount of money and 
simultaneously decide whether or not to “destroy” the other player's payoff for a price. The 
authors manipulate whether or not there is a one in three chance that an “act of nature” would 
destroy their opponent’s money anyway. The authors find the destruction rates rise significantly 
during the aforementioned treatment1, despite the fact that no strategic reason exists for such a 
decision. This implies that some individuals simply take pleasure in destruction.    
 Even though employees may not need an overt economic incentive to engage in sabotage, 
it certainly does not hurt. Prior literature shows that workers compensated under a tournament 
incentive scheme are more likely to engage in sabotage than those under piece rate compensation 
(Carpenter et al. 2010). This is because those in a rank order tournament benefit the most 
economically from sabotage. Those being paid a flat wage receive no economic benefit at all 
from sabotage.  
                                                          
1 If we view the results of this study in light of Bicchieri’s (2006) model, the results seem to suggest that the 
participants were able to evade any social norms that would discourage destruction by hiding behind uncertainty 
not unlike the participants in Abdel-Rahim and Stevens (2015) 
10 
 
 Based on prior literature, simply having relative performance information provides 
enough social incentives to engage in sabotage regardless of whether employees are 
compensated via a tournament or flat wage. However, only tournament compensation provides a 
clear economic incentive to engage in sabotage. Therefore I expect that employees will engage in 
more sabotage when compensated under a tournament incentive system than given a flat wage. 
 H1: Employees will engage in more sabotage when compensated under a 
tournament incentive system than given a flat wage 
 Because of the harm that sabotage can have on productivity, researchers have suggested a 
variety of countermeasures. Some have proposed implementing a system that can identify and 
sanction such behavior (Balafoutas et al. 2012). Others have suggested reducing the economic 
incentives either by promoting based solely on seniority or instituting pay equality rather than 
tournament prizes (Chen 2003; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2008). Other proposals include gender 
quotas during promotion because of the disproportionate likelihood that males will engage in 
sabotage (Dato and Nieken 2014). In addition, others have proposed reducing the sting sabotage 
might have on productivity by eliminating relative performance information, which reduces the 
chance that others in the group will combine their efforts to sabotage the highest performer 
(Gürtler et al. 2013). It’s worth noting that each of the previously proposed solutions is 
admittedly not without its drawbacks. Some would be either costly to implement (Balafoutas et 
al. 2012) or may reduce the positive effects tournaments may offer (Harbring and Irlenbusch 
2008). For example, public relative performance information has been shown to have a positive 
effect on individuals under certain types of performance-based contracts (Tafkov 2013; Newman 
and Tafkov 2014). I propose a different solution. Managers can utilize social norms by 
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presenting the employees an opportunity to agree to a code of ethics that specifically condemns 
sabotage. 
Code of Ethics 
 Langlois and Schlegelmilch (1990 p. 522) define a corporate code of ethics as ‘‘a 
statement setting down corporate principles, ethics, rules of conduct, codes of practice or 
company philosophy concerning responsibility to employees, shareholders, consumers, the 
environment, or any other aspects of society external to the company.’’ Although a heightened 
research interest has followed the increased prevalence of corporate codes, most of the research 
has focused on the content of these codes rather than their effect on behavior (Benson 1989; 
Jamal and Bowie 1995; Stajkovic and Luthans 1997; Svensson et al. 2009; Bodolica and 
Spraggon 2015; Komic et al. 2015). Furthermore, those studies that focus on the effectiveness of 
a code of ethics seem to yield mixed results. Some researchers have found that organizations that 
utilize a code of ethics report a lower incidence of misconduct and rate their companies as more 
ethical (Pierce and Henry 1996; Schwartz 2001; Somers 2001; KPMG 2008). While other studies 
conclude that a code of ethics doesn’t positively affect behavior and is simply a way to protect 
the company from legal liability (Stevens 1994; Cleek and Leonard 1998; McKendall et al. 2002; 
Helin and Sandstrom 2007). In a review of research that examines the effectiveness of a code of 
ethics in corporations, Kaptein and Schwartz (2008) attribute the mixed results to a lack of 
theory, deficiencies in research methodologies and an inconsistent definition of a code of ethics. 
 Watruba, Chonko, and Loe (2001) illustrate three major reasons why a company should 
adopt a code of ethics: (1) to show that they value ethical behavior; (2) to relay their ethical 
values to the members of their organization; and (3) to impact employee behavior (Wotruba et al. 
2001). Over the last thirty years, there has been a sharp rise in the number of companies that 
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have instituted a code of ethics/conduct within their organization (KPMG 2008). Ironically, the 
rise doesn’t seem to be attributed to a crisis of conscious. According to KMPG, 85% of the 
Global 200 companies polled gave “compliance with legal requirements” as the primary reason 
for having a code of ethics. Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  (SOX 2002) requires 
organizations to disclose the adoption of a corporate code of ethics or justify the absence of such 
a code.  In addition, the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ now require all listed firms to 
adopt and disclose their corporate code of ethics. The motivation behind why an organization 
implements a code of ethics may be a major contributor to how effective it is. If employees 
perceive that a code of ethics merely exists to fulfill a legal requirement, then they may be less 
likely to (1) perceive that they company values ethical conduct; (2) know what the company 
values; and (3) develop expectations that influence their behavior.  
 More recently, other researchers have attempted to identify the specific determinants that 
make a corporate code of ethics successful after observing that the mere existence of a code of 
ethics may not be enough to affect behavior (Wotruba et al. 2001; Kaptein and Schwartz 2008; 
Singh 2011). Wotruba et al. (2001) surveyed nearly three hundred executives that were members 
of the Direct Selling Association. They found that effectiveness of the code of ethics was 
associated with familiarity and usefulness. Singh (2011) surveyed the CEOs of over one hundred 
of Canada’s top 500 companies. He found that the effectiveness of the code of ethics was 
associated with its communication and perceived enforcement within the organization. Davidson 
and Stevens (2013) captured these two attributes by having participants “certify” the code of 
ethics. They utilized an investment game and found that a code of ethics improved manager 
return behavior and investor confidence only to the extent that it activated social norms that 
control opportunistic behavior. It wasn’t until managers “certified” the code of ethics that these 
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benefits were achieved. Further analysis revealed that the underlying mechanism driving their 
results was the activation of the social norm of promise keeping as predicted by Bicchieri’s 
(2006) model of social norm activation (Davidson and Stevens 2013). As I explain below, social 
norm theory can also be used to predict the results of both Wotruba et al. (2001) and Singh 
(2011).   
Social Norm Theory  
 As summarized in Blay et al. (2015) the roots of social norm theory can be traced back to 
Adam Smith’s (1759/1790) influential work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith asserted 
that mankind is gifted with a natural reverence for the general rules of conduct. This natural 
respect for social norms can be observed in the substantial role that norms and laws play in 
sustaining order throughout society (Smith 1759/1790; Blay et al. 2015). Bicchieri’s (2006) 
model of social norm activation explains how people interpret the motives and expectations of 
others. Consistent with Adam Smith’s (1759/1790) moral theory, the model suggests that social 
norm activation relies on situational cues and information that shape beliefs and expectations.   
 According to the Bicchieri model, first, there is a contingency condition. This condition is 
essential to the activation of a social norm. The contingency condition asserts that individuals are 
aware that a behavioral rule R exists and applies to situations of type S. In other words, everyone 
has to know about the behavioral rule and its relevance to the current situation. Next, the 
Bicchieri model describes the empirical expectations condition. This is a belief that an 
adequately  large subset of the population P conforms to the behavioral rule R in situations of 
type S. These expectations are often based on observed behavior in similar situations and can be 
strengthened or weakened by the ensuing observed behavior. Finally, the Bicchieri model 
describes two normative expectations conditions. The first normative condition states that 
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individuals believe an adequately large subset of P expects them to conform to R in situations of 
type S. What makes the situation normative is that individual’s perception of what other people 
believe that an individual has an obligation to confirm to R in the appropriate circumstances. The 
belief that others’ normative expectations are reasonable or legitimate can be sufficient to 
motivate behavior consistent with a social norm. The second normative condition adds the belief 
that others may be willing to sanction the individual’s behavior when they can observe it. This 
possibility of sanctions may be necessary for some individuals to follow a social norm. Bicchieri 
(2006, 45) also asserts that social norms are complex, and “several norms may apply to the same 
situation, or it may not be clear which norms have a bearing in a given case.’’ Simply publically 
agreeing to act “ethically” (as is the case in my study) may activate any number of social norms 
including fairness, reciprocity, and trustworthiness (in addition to the social norm of promise-
keeping) (Bicchieri 2006). 
 In summary, her model suggests that a social norm is activated when a person is made 
aware of a behavioral rule that is relevant to the current situation (the contingency stage). That 
person will then follow that rule if he believes that there are both empirical and normative 
expectations that give him a sufficient reason to follow the behavioral rule. Bicchieri’s model 
predicts the results of the surveys reported in both the Wotruba et al. (2001) and Singh (2011) 
studies. In their respective studies, communication and familiarity are both indicators that the 
employees will reach Bicchieri’s contingency stage. Likewise, usefulness and enforcement are 
both indicators that the company has provided both empirical and normative expectations which 
lead to compliance with the norm within the organization. Bicchieri’s model also empowers 
experimental researchers to develop testable hypotheses related to contextual factors on moral 
reasoning and behavior. For example, the effectiveness of a contextual factor (such as requiring 
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certification of a code of ethics) is based on its ability to alter empirical and normative 
expectations for a given norm. I believe that by having every employee agree to sign a code of 
ethics, a company can provide both empirical and normative expectations that will lead the 
employee to keep their promise and adhere to the code (Bicchieri 2006; Davidson and Stevens 
2013).  
The Interaction of Economic Incentives and Social Norms 
 Initially, because none of the participants have been able to observe each other’s 
behavior, a normative expectation (rather than an empirical expectation) would likely have the 
most influence over their behavior. In the presence of a certified code of ethics, a strong 
normative expectation is established (Davidson and Stevens 2013). In this study, the code of 
ethics is designed to discourage sabotage and encourage fidelity. As a result, I would expect the 
participants who certify a code of ethics to initially abstain from engaging in sabotage.  In 
addition, immediately after the task begins, participants will start to develop an empirical 
expectation based on what they observe. Therefore, their initial observed fidelity should be 
reinforced by the subsequent observation of ethical behavior.  
 I expect that, absent a code of ethics, employees under tournament compensation would 
engage in more sabotage than employees given a flat wage (see H1). Therefore, if I expect a 
code of ethics can reduce sabotage at all, I would expect it to have a greater effect on those under 
a tournament incentive than those given a flat wage simply because those under tournament 
compensation have more room to improve. However, it is possible that because a code of ethics 
primes the employee to think of the possible harm (s)he could cause to others (rather than 
thinking solely about their own benefit), that those in a tournament might sabotage less than 
those given a flat wage (Tsang 2002). This is because sabotage during a tournament causes both 
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social and economic harm to others, while sabotage under flat wage compensation does not 
cause any economic harm to others. Therefore, even though that a code of ethics primes 
employees to think of others regardless of condition, it is easier to rationalize bad behavior under 
a flat wage compensation because (unlike under a tournament) there is no economic harm. In any 
case, I predict that having employees certify a code of ethics will have a larger effect on sabotage 
for those under tournament based compensation than those under piece rate or flat wage 
compensation. 
H2: Having employees certify a code of ethics will have a larger mitigating effect on 
sabotage for those under tournament based compensation than those flat wage 
compensation. 
Effects on Overall Productivity 
 Overall Group Productivity can be simply defined as Group Effort – Group Effort 
Wasted due to Sabotage. Like sabotage, Group Effort can be influenced by both economic and 
social factors. Although the flat wage condition may lack an economic incentive to give effort, 
participants are given relative performance feedback in that they will be able to view each 
other’s actions in real-time with a single winner being declared for each round. In the presence of 
relative performance information, even without economic incentives, individuals can be 
motivated to exert effort simply because they take joy in outperforming others. Evidence of 
simple social comparison motivating effort has appeared in psychology, economic and 
accounting literatures (Suls and Wills 1991; Hannan et al. 2008; Dohmen et al. 2011; Tafkov 
2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014) and has even lead famous children’s author C.S. Lewis to 
write: 
17 
 
 We say that people are proud of being rich, or clever, or good-looking, but they are not. 
 They are proud of being richer, or cleverer, or better-looking than others. If everyone else 
 became equally rich, or clever, or good-looking there would be nothing to be proud 
 about. It is the comparison that makes you proud: the pleasure of being above the rest. 
 Once the element of competition has gone, pride has gone (Lewis 1952, 81). 
Therefore, I expect all participants, even those in the flat wage conditions, to put forth significant 
effort. By the same token, although tournaments provide employees a positive economic 
incentive to put forth more effort in order to outperform their colleagues, repeated tournaments 
can also be accompanied by negative social factors such as  complacency by the winners and 
dejection by the losers (Berger et al. 2013). Therefore, because tournaments have been associated 
with both an increase in effort due to economic incentives and a decrease in effort due to 
discouragement, it is difficult to predict the effect of the economic incentive on group effort. 
This makes it difficult to predict the interactive effects on overall productivity. Likewise, it is 
difficult to predict the effects of a code of ethics on effort. Unlike sabotage, effort might not have 
much room for improvement. 
 However, if tournaments are accompanied by an increase in sabotage (as I predict in H1) 
then the effect of tournaments on Group Loss due to Sabotage (and therefore group productivity) 
is quite clear. The increase in sabotage that I predict will accompany a tournament incentive can 
lead to Group Loss in two ways, through discouragement and/or redundancy. In repeated 
periods, sabotage can be demoralizing and may lead to employees exerting less effort than they 
would otherwise. Sabotage also directly leads to Group Loss because of the redundancy of effort. 
For example, one member of a sales division might put forth a significant amount of effort in 
order to win over a client only to have another member of sales division go after the same client 
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(rather than someone else) in an effort to steal his sale. In this case, had both members gone after 
separate clients, the company might have had twice as many sales with the same amount of 
collective effort.  The effect of a code of ethics on Group Loss is discernable. Prior literature 
leads me to believe, that when workers certify a code of ethics that condemns sabotage, the 
activation of the social norm of promise keeping will discourage sabotage (Davidson and 
Stevens 2013).  
 Because Group Productivity is the difference between Group Effort and Group Loss and 
the effects of incentive compensation and a code of ethics on Group Effort is unclear, I pose the 
following research question in order to explore the effects these two factors have on overall 
productivity. 
RQ1: How will having employees certify a code of ethics affect the productivity of those 
under tournament based compensation versus those under a flat wage compensation? 
III. METHODOLOGY  
Experimental Task 
 The participants are given instructions that explain that they had been hired by “Painter 
Corp” to paint a series of canvases. They are told that the goal of Painter Corp is to have as much 
of each canvas painted as possible. The computerized task is a modified version of a single mini-
game featured in the videogame Mario Party 4 (Nintendo 2002). In the mini-game, entitled 
Stamp Out!, four2 players, each sitting on top of a uniquely colored machine that resembles a 
                                                          
2 During the experimental task, only three players are active. The fourth is an inactive host player who is controlled 
by the experimenter. This is detailed later on in the paper.  
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pogo stick atop a stamp pad3, simultaneously try to “paint” as much of a large single white 
canvas as they can in 30 seconds. All the participants witness each other’s activity in real-time 
while a count-down timer is displayed at the top of the screen. At the end of a 30 second round, 
each player is shown what percentage of the total canvas has been covered in their unique color. 
Players control their stamp pad by manipulating five keys on their computer keyboard, namely 
the four directional arrow keys and “X” key4. Every time a player stamps the canvas, the spot on 
the canvas where the player has stamped is painted with their unique color. Therefore, it is 
possible that any one player can stamp over an area that was previously painted by another 
player. Stamping over a spot where another player has previously painted increased the amount 
of canvas that they are credited with painting while simultaneously decreasing the amount of 
canvas the other player is credited with painting. However, the canvas is large enough that each 
of the three active players has the opportunity to paint as much of the canvas as they are capable 
of without needing to paint over a colleague5. This fact is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
                                                          
3 The participants control a character that is sitting on top of a large rubber stamp filled with ink. Each time the 
participant presses the “X” key, the character (while sitting on top of the stamp) can “hop” a certain distance along 
the white canvas thereby creating a new ink spot with the rubber stamp. The distance the character hops depends 
on the amount of time the participant holds down the “A” key. Each additional hop requires and additional 
pressing of the “X” key.  See Figure 1 for screenshots of the gameplay.  
 
4 The real effort task of attempting to paint as much of the canvas as possible by hopping on a rubber stamp 
captures all four components of the effort construct mentioned in (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002): direction, duration, 
intensity, and strategy development. (1) Direction: The employee may direct their avatar in any direction they 
choose (2) Duration: The employee may choose how long they want to engage in the activity (and they are also 
compensated for inactivity) (3) Intensity: it takes focus to precisely time the key strokes in order to quickly cover 
the most ground. Mindlessly mashing the “A” will not result in the fastest movement. (4) Strategy: navigating the 
field of play and deciding if/when to engage in sabotage. 
 
5 In pre-trial testing, the maximum amount a very skilled player could paint in 30 seconds was 25% of the canvas. 
Similarly, during the experiment, the maximum amount that any participant could paint in 30 seconds was 25% of 
the canvas (two participants achieved this feat). The maximum amount that any group of participants could paint 
was 64% of the canvas.  
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Figure 1 
 Part A: 
Screenshots of the Incentivized Task (with Sabotage) 
 
  
   The participants start in the position seen above.         In the example above, all three active avatars                                                              
                                                                                            can be seen actively engaging in sabotage    
                                                                                                      
 
                                                                                            
             A total of 32% of the canvas was painted by the participants. The red avatar (Mario) was                                  
.                        controlled by the host computer and was inactive throughout the experiment.                                                                                            
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Figure 1 (continued) 
Part B: 
Screenshots of the Incentivized Task (without Sabotage) 
 
The participants start in the position seen above.           In the example above, all three active avatars                                                              
                                                                                                  do not wish to engage in sabotage    
 
 
        A total of 55% of the canvas was painted by the participants. As always, the red avatar (Mario)                
.                 was controlled by the host computer and was inactive throughout the experiment.                                                                                        
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 The task was performed in an experimental lab that contained a series of networked 
computers inside private cubicles. Although, the software was originally designed to support four 
networked players simultaneously performing the computerized task, participants were instead 
arranged into groups of three and assigned to computers that were networked into a fourth “host 
player”. The fourth inactive host player was controlled by the experimenter. This allowed the 
experimenter to completely control the flow of the task, simultaneously monitor all activity, and 
better analyze the experiment.  
 All participants remain completely anonymous to each other, so that any behavior 
exhibited during the experiment is not influenced by prior relationships or fear of post-
experimental reprisals. Each participant is separated from each other by cubicle dividers and 
avatars are positioned in an irregular arrangement. Additionally, in a post-experimental 
questionnaire, each participant was asked the following two questions: 
Did you, at any time, know the true identity of anyone else’s avatar? 
 
            YES             NO,         If yes, please explain how: 
 
Did anyone else, at any time, know the true identity of your avatar? 
 
            YES             NO,         If yes, please explain how: 
For each question, 177 out of 180 participants indicated that they and everyone else were 
completely anonymous6.  
 Participants were assigned an avatar and groups of three by utilizing covariate adaptive 
randomization7 (Fleiss et al. 2003). Because prior research has associated gender with sabotage, 
                                                          
6 The participants that indicated otherwise said they could hear “sighs” or sounds of excitement coming from 
another participant at the end of each match. Removing these data does not significantly affect the conclusions in 
this study.  
7 Because my sample size was relatively small, I had to make sure that any anticipated covariates (such as gender) 
were evenly balanced across conditions. I used random assignment unless this resulted in group that was 
composed of all one gender. If that happened, I randomly switched two participants between groups until each 
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groups were initially randomly assigned, but rearranged if a group contained only one gender. 
This was done in order to balance a potential covariate across conditions (Suresh 2011).  
 Although, the three active participants are asymmetrically arranged on the board, a post-
experimental analysis of the task revealed that the initial starting position of the participant was 
not a significant predictor of sabotage (p = 0.554, two-tailed).  
 After the instructions were given, the participants complete a short quiz that ensures they 
understand the instructions, including their economic incentives, the goal of painter crop, and how 
sabotage effected overall productivity. The participants are then told that, before officially starting 
the job, they would have to complete Painter Corp’s training program. Each participant was given 
five training rounds. During training, they were told to “try their best” and were allowed to request 
personal help during this period. The training rounds were completed and recorded on a duplicate 
program that was pre-set for solo play (in which all other avatars are inactive). After five rounds 
of practice, they are switched over to the main program that is pre-set for networked play. 
 Next, the participants begin the recorded experimental group task for at least 10 rounds. At 
the end of the tenth round, a coin is flipped in order to determine if the experiment will include an 
additional round. This process is continued until the result of the coin flip determines that the 
experiment is over. The method that determines the number of total rounds played is explained 
during the initial instructions and is used in order to prevent “end game effects” (Schatzberg and 
Stevens 2008; Douthit et al. 2012).  
 After the final round of the experiment is over, the participants answer a post-
experimental questionnaire, are paid anonymously in cash, and leave.  
                                                          
group had at least one of each gender. This method has an advantage over stratified randomization, in that it can 
balance the covariates even  when the sample size is relatively small (Hu et al. 2014) 
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Independent Variables 
 In my experiment, I controlled both the presence and absence of a code of ethics and the 
type of incentive compensation scheme (tournament / flat wage) utilized. The task was described 
along with how they will be compensated. In the “code” condition, after the practice period, 
immediately before the recorded task begins, the employees were presented with a single sheet 
of paper with the company’s code of ethics: 
As an employee, hired by the company, I am expected to adhere to the following: 
 
  I will act in good faith with the intention to add value to the company through hard work 
and ethical conduct. 
  I will act responsibly and ethically with regard to my fellow employees and will not seek 
personal gain at their expense. 
This code of ethics is an adapted and simplified version of what would typically be seen in the 
workplace8. Consistent with Pragmatic Theory of Language, by limiting the content in the code 
of ethics I help ensure message delivery and highlight its importance (Huang 2007; Bloomfield 
2012). The participants were then required to certify this code of ethics by signing and dating the 
bottom of the page.  
 How the participants were to be economically incentivized was outlined in the 
experimental instructions and varied according to the experimental condition. The participants 
were paid in an experimental currency, Lira, denoted by the “£” symbol. Under a flat wage 
incentive scheme, each participant was paid £200 per 30 second round regardless of production. 
Under the tournament incentive scheme, whoever has the highest percentage of the canvas 
                                                          
8 The code of ethics was taken from the Manufacturers’ Agents National Association (MANA) and adapted and 
simplified for the experimental procedure. See Appendix A.   
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painted at the end of each 30 second round were paid £400. The other two participants were paid 
£100. In case of a tie, the two winners received £250 with the remaining participant receiving 
£100. In case of a three-way tie, all three participants would receive £200.  
 In addition, because the real effort task may resemble how some participants may spend 
their real life leisure time (playing a video game), the participants were also compensated for 
their inactivity during the task in order to better distinguish between effort and leisure. In all 
conditions, participants were told that they would be compensated £2 for every second of 
inactivity in a 30 second round (which could result in a maximum £60 bonus). This method of 
ensuring that effort is costly follows the lead of similar methods utilized in experimental 
accounting research (Sprinkle 2000; Hecht et al. 2012; Newman and Tafkov 2014). The 
instructions ended by telling participants that at the end of the experiment, a random round 
would be selected and the payoff for that round will be converted from Lira into Dollars at the 
predetermined exchange rate, so they should treat each round as the payoff round. 
Dependent Variables 
 The task was video recorded on each group’s “host” computer. Individual sabotage 
occurred when one employee painted over a portion of the canvas that had already been painted 
by another employee. Each video was carefully analyzed in order to correctly record the amount 
of sabotage that had been done by each avatar. The correlation between the two sabotage coders 
was 0.953 with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.973, which exceeds typical reliability thresholds (Field 
2013)9. Group Sabotage was calculated by recording the sum of all the individual sabotage that 
                                                          
9 Such a high number isn’t surprising considering that the coders that were rating sabotage were essentially 
engaging in slow, careful, counting rather than trying give a subjective assessment. See Appendix B for an excerpt 
from the sabotage coding instructions.      
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occurred within the group during a 30 second round. Individual Redundancy Loss occurred when 
one employee was sabotaged by another employee. Group Redundancy Loss was calculated by 
recording the sum of all the individual redundancy loss that occurred within the group during a 
30 second round. Because the canvas is a closed system, by definition Group Sabotage = Group 
Redundancy Loss. In other words, whenever one employee sabotaged another, an equal amount 
of sabotage and loss occurred within the group. Individual productivity was recorded as the 
percentage of the canvas that had been painted by the avatar’s unique color at the end of the 30 
second round. At the end of each round the computer program displayed the percentage of the 
canvas that was covered by each avatar and declared a winner. Group Productivity was 
calculated by recording the total percentage of the canvas that was covered by the three 
employees10. Individual Effort11 was represented by the amount of canvas an employee would 
have been credited with painting (Individual Productivity) if redundancy loss due to sabotage 
from another employee had not occurred. Thus Individual Effort = Individual Productivity + 
Individual Redundancy Loss. Likewise Group Effort = Group Productivity + Group Redundancy 
Loss. Group Effort could also be calculated by recording the sum of all Individual Effort within 
the group. Individual Effort Withheld12 was recorded as the individual’s highest effort recorded 
                                                          
10 Although there were four avatars on the screen, the red avatar (Mario) was controlled by the host computer and 
was inactive throughout the experiment. 
 
11 Although keystrokes were recorded, they do not serve as a good proxy for effort because they only represent 
one reliable measured attribute of effort (duration). While the act of painting as much of the canvas as possible 
incorporates all four attributes of effort: direction, duration, intensity, and strategy development (Bonner and 
Sprinkle 2002).   
 
12 I am confident that individual learning did not confound this measure for two reasons (1) Only 6% of the 
recorded rounds have an avatar giving more effort than that of their highest recorded training round. (2) The 
round the participants were in was not a significant predictor of Individual Effort (p = 0.849, two-tailed). 
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during the training rounds minus the individual effort recorded for that period. Group Effort 
Withheld was calculated as the sum of all the Individual Effort Withheld within the group. 
 
IV. RESULTS 
Participants 
 A total of 180 student participants from a large southeastern university engaged in the 
experiment. Participants included 76 males and 104 females whose age ranged from 18 to 62 
years old, with an average age of 22.7 years. The experiment lasted approximately 30 minutes 
for which participants received an average of $9.8813.  
Test of H1 
 H1 predicted that, absent a code of ethics, employees will engage in more sabotage when 
compensated under a tournament incentive system than given a flat wage. Panel A of Table 1 
gives the descriptive statistics of Group Effort Wasted due to Sabotage. My test results, shown in 
Panel B of Table 1, illustrated that those employed under a tournament incentive system engaged 
in more sabotage (26.37%) than those given a flat wage (20.24%) (p<0.01, one-tailed) which 
supports H1.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 The participants were informed that they could leave the experiment at any time and still receive a “show-up” 
fee of $5.   
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Table 1 
Panel A:  
 
 
Panel B: 
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 Figure 2 presents a graph that shows the average amount of Group Redundancy Loss due 
to Sabotage that occurred each round under each treatment group.  
Figure 2 
Mean Group Sabotage per Round 
 
 
 
Test of H2 
 I directly test the participants normative and empirical expectation (via a post-
experimental questionnaire) in order to both reaffirm the findings and illuminate the theoretical 
mechanism of Bicchieri’s model (2006). In other words, in order to affirm that a code of ethics 
led to a change in behavior because of social norm activation, it is necessary to measure the 
mechanism by which a social norm is activated (the normative and empirical expectations of the 
participants). In a post-experimental questionnaire, the participants were asked to respond to a 
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series of statements by utilizing a seven-point a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Their response to the following statement tested their empirical expectations: 
  
 Before I started the task, I expected that the other employees would not paint over an area 
 of the canvas that I had already painted. 
 
Their response to the following statement tested their normative expectations: 
  
 Before the task began, the other employees expected me not to paint over an area of the 
 canvas that they had already painted. 
 
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the responses to the questions testing the empirical and 
normative expectations respectively. Participants who certified a code of ethics, regardless of the 
incentive compensation type present, responded with an average Likert score that was 
significantly higher than 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed) to both questions. On the other hand, the 
responses of those who had not certified a code of ethics, regardless of incentive compensation 
type present, were not significantly different than the middle Likert response of 4. This shows 
that certifying a code of ethics leads to a significant measurable change in both empirical and 
normative expectations,  which should lead to a change in behavior according to Bicchieri’s 
model (2006).  
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive statistics for PEQ measure of empirical and normative 
expectations (the process by which a social norm is activated) 
 
 
 
 H2 predicted that having employees certify a code of ethics will have a larger effect on 
sabotage for those under tournament based compensation than those under piece rate or flat wage 
compensation. One of the reasons a code of ethics could also have less of an effect on sabotage 
when employees are given a flat wage is because it’s easier to rationalize bad behavior (evade 
the norm) when there are no financial consequences (Tsang 2002).  
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I first estimate a repeated measures ANCOVA in Panel A of Table 3 for which the dependent 
variable is Individual Sabotage and which analyzes Code / No Code and Tournament / Flat Wage 
between subjects and Round within subjects while controlling for the individual effects of the 
participants’ gender, avatar/position, and measured risk preferences14. Because gender is the only 
                                                          
14 Risk preferences were measured using an simplified form of a lottery choice task in which the participants could 
choose between a 50% chance of receiving $2 or 100% chance of receiving $1 (Holt and Laury 2002; Hales et al. 
2014) 
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significant covariate in Panel A, I retain it as a covariate in Panel B15 of Table 3 in which I 
estimate a repeated measures ANCOVA for which the dependent variable is Group Redundancy 
Loss due to Sabotage and which tests the same between and within subjects factors as Panel A.  
 
As predicted by H2, I find a significant Code / No Code x Tournament / Flat Wage interaction (F 
= 7.69, p < 0.01).  Figure 3 illustrates the disordinal interaction.  
                                                          
15 In Panel B, Gender, measured as the number of males in the group is not a significant covariate of Group 
Redundancy Loss. This indicates that my use of covariate adaptive randomization successfully mitigated the effects 
of gender as a potential covariate on Group Activity.  
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Test of RQ1 
  RQ1 aims to explore the effects of the incentive scheme and the certification of a 
code of ethics on overall productivity. In other words, which combination would result in the 
highest level of productivity? Recall that Productivity is the result of both Effort and Sabotage. 
In addition, because Sabotage cannot only hinder current productivity, but also discourage future 
effort, Group Effort Withheld was measured in an attempt to capture discouragement. Panel A of 
Table 4 the descriptive statistics of Group Productivity. 
35 
 
 
 
Flat Wage*Code and Tournament*Code were the two conditions with the highest level of 
average Group Productivity (with 48.72% and 49.63% of the canvas covered respectively). The 
difference between these two conditions is not significant (p = 0.323, two-tailed) and these two 
conditions are higher than both the Flat Wage * No Code (p < 0.01, two-tailed) and the 
Tournament * No Code condition (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Curiously, those in the Tournament * 
Code condition reported the highest variance for Effort, and Effort Withheld.  
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 In Panel B of Table 4, I estimated a repeated measures ANCOVA for which the 
dependent variable is Group Productivity and which analyzes Code / No Code and Tournament / 
Flat Wage between subjects and Round within subjects while controlling for Gender. The 
certification of a code of ethics has a significant main effect (p <0.01 two-tailed); However, there 
is also a significant interaction between Code of Ethics Certification and Compensation Incentive 
used (p <0.01, two-tailed). Figure 4 illustrates this interaction.  
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After further investigation, I discovered that the high variances in Effort, and Effort Withheld 
reported in the Tournament * Code condition could be explained by how strongly that group 
became discouraged as a result of sabotage. 
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Panel A of Tables 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the response to the post-experimental 
question designed to capture discouragement. The participants were asked to respond to the 
following question by utilizing a seven-point a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree).   
  The behavior of others discouraged me from trying my best 
Despite the fact that those in the Tournament * Code condition experienced the least amount of 
sabotage, their response to that post experiment question , 4.71 (p = 0.013), indicates they were 
the only condition that felt any level of discouragement as a result of sabotage. Their behavior 
also indicates discouragement.  
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Panel B of Table 5 displays the number of rounds an individual participant exhibited a particular 
level of effort by condition. I assign the highest level of effort given during the individual 
training rounds (in which they were told to “try their best”, as the participant’s maximum effort. I 
then divided their individual effort during the test rounds by this maximum in order to see if they 
were giving their best effort throughout the experiment. Panel B of Table 5 shows that there 25 
individual occurrences in the Tournament * Code condition where the participants gave less than 
50% of the potential maximum effort. In those instances, it could be said that they simply “gave 
up”. Compare this to the 4, 6, and 9 times this occurred in the other conditions. There were 12 
occurrences were participants gave less than 10% of their maximum effort in the Tournament * 
No Code condition compared to 5 occurrences in the Tournament No Code condition and 0 
occurrences in the other two conditions. Simply put, those participants who had experienced 
sabotage after certifying a code of ethics under tournament compensation were more likely to be 
so uniquely discouraged that, unlike those in the other conditions, they subsequently exerted 
little to no effort and dragged down the mean Group Effort and Group Productivity for the rest of 
those in the same experimental condition.  
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Other Social Norms Activated 
 I assert that any change in behavior caused by the certification of a code of ethics would 
happen because the social norm of promise keeping would be activated as predicted by Bicchieri’s  
model (2006) of social norm activation. However, simply publically agreeing to act “ethically” (as 
is the case in my study) may activate any number of other social norms including fairness, 
reciprocity, and trustworthiness. In my post-experimental questionnaire, I attempt to find out what 
other social norms are activated when my participants certified a code of ethics.  
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Promise Keeping. On Panel A of Table 6, I first measure the social norm activation of promise 
keeping the by asking participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a 
Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): 
 My behavior was based on my desire to keep my promise 
As expected, those participants who certified a code of ethics gave an average response of 5.15  
which is significantly higher than the middle value of 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed). By contrast, those 
who did not certify a code of ethics gave an average response of 4.07, which was not 
significantly different than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.718, two-tailed). Thus indicating that 
certifying a code of ethics specifically led to a promise keeping norm activation.  
 Fairness. I next measure the activation of the social norm of fairness by asking 
participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a Likert scale of 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): 
 My behavior was based on my desire to be fair 
Again, the participants who certified a code of ethics gave an average response of 4.90, which is 
significantly higher than the middle value of 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed). Those under the tournament 
condition, who did not certify a code of ethics gave an average response of 3.22, which was 
significantly lower than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.013, two-tailed). Thus indicating that a 
desire to be fair did not affect their behavior.  While, those in the Flat Wage * No Code condition 
gave an average response of 3.93, which was not significantly different than 4 (p = 0.805, two-
tailed).  
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 Reciprocity. Panel B of Table 6 shows the results of reciprocity norm activation, which I 
measure by asking participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a Likert 
scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): 
 My behavior was based on my desire to reciprocate the behavior of others 
This time, the participants who did not certify a code of ethics gave an average response of 4.63  
which is significantly higher than the middle value of 4 (p<0.01, two-tailed). This is not 
surprising, given the amount of sabotage that took place under those conditions and how 
instinctual and ubiquitous the norm of revenge / negative reciprocity is (Lillie and Strelan 2016). 
Those under the flat wage * code condition, gave an average response of 4.29, which was not 
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significantly different than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.341, two-tailed). While those in the 
Tournament * Code condition gave an average response of 4.84, which was significantly higher 
than 4 (p = 0.805, two-tailed). Given the low amount of sabotage present in that condition, this 
might indicate that their behavior was influenced by a desire to exhibit positive reciprocity. 
 Trustworthiness. Finally, I measure the activation of the social norm of trustworthiness 
by asking participants to respond to the following statement using a seven-point a Likert scale of 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree): 
 My behavior was based on my desire to be trustworthy. 
The responses mirror that of the fairness norm. The participants who certified a code of ethics 
gave an average response of 4.91, which is significantly higher than the middle value of 4 
(p<0.01, two-tailed). Those in the Tournament * No Code condition, gave an average response of 
3.13, which was significantly lower than the middle value of 4 (p = 0.013, two-tailed). Thus 
indicating that a desire to be trustworthy did not affect their behavior.  While, those in the Flat 
Wage * No Code condition gave an average response of 4.07, which was not significantly 
different than 4 (p = 0.795, two-tailed).  
 As Bicchieri’s (2006) model allows for, my code of ethics appeared to have, indeed, 
activated several social norms, namely, promise keeping, fairness, and trustworthiness. 
Conversely, the social norm of reciprocity did not appear to need code of ethics certification to 
be activated.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 I study the effectiveness of a code of ethics on sabotage, effort, and productivity under 
two different incentive systems, namely fixed wage and tournament. Tournaments are often used  
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because of their ability to attract top talent, reduce environmental risk, and motivate employees 
to give their best effort (Lazear and Rosen 1981b; Grote 2005; McGregor 2006; Ng and Lublin 
2010). However, because the incentive structure explicitly evokes competition, employees may 
be reluctant to cooperate and might even engage in strategic behavior such as sabotage (Lazear 
1989; Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011; Dato and Nieken 2014).  
 The remedies suggested to reduce sabotage involve reducing the economic incentives that 
contribute to both beneficial and harmful behavior (Chen 2003). In the accounting literature to 
date, no remedy for the harmful effects of a tournament incentive has been investigated because 
the ability to sabotage has been restricted by way of tight experimental control. I utilize an 
experiment in which participants perform a real effort task which allows them to sabotage each 
other and receive relative performance feedback in real-time. I examine a very attractive form of 
sabotage: overtly stealing credit from fellow employees. This often talks place in the workplace 
and can effect raises and promotion decisions (Uzzi and Dunlap 2012; Dillon 2014). I chose to 
study this attractive form of sabotage because any remedy I found would also presumably work 
on less attractive, forms of sabotage, such as costly destruction. I manipulated the presence or 
absence of a code of ethics (that condemns sabotage) and the type of incentive compensation 
used (tournament / flat wage) in order to examine their effects on individual employee behavior 
and overall firm productivity. I first predict that sabotage during a tournament will be higher than 
fixed pay because of the higher incentive to sabotage during a tournament. I employ Bicchieri’s 
(2006) model of social norm activation to make applicable predictions that advance theory 
related to harmful behavior such as sabotage and ways to control such behavior in the firm. I 
predict and find that by employing a code of ethics, I can activate the social norm of promise 
keeping which discourages those in a tournament from engaging in sabotage, while still giving 
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their best effort. However, I discover this might not work in all cases. In a minority of cases, I 
discover that if in which sabotage persists under a tournament in spite of a code of ethics, 
participants become more discouraged than they would otherwise. 
 I propose to extend the literature by demonstrating a way to reduce the negative effects of 
sabotage under tournament based compensation. In addition, by utilizing real effort tasks with 
real-time relative performance feedback and allowing for sabotage, I can examine the effect with 
increased ecological validity. Furthermore, although competition-induced sabotage has been 
shown to be a problem under a tournament incentive scheme when allowed, as of yet no solution 
has been proposed which can reduce this potential shortcoming of tournament incentives. In 
addition, by directly measuring the participants normative and empirical expectations, I also 
hope to extend prior literature by further exploring the underlying mechanisms that manage 
Bicchieri’s model of social norm activation, which models social norms in a way that can be 
readily incorporated within traditional agency theory while utilizing current research in social 
norms from the behavioral literature.   
 This study also has potential implications for practice. The results of this study suggest that 
if companies truly want to activate a social norm that would assuage negative behavior, like 
sabotage, that they should not simply adopt a code of ethics for regulatory compliance. They 
should, instead, implement a system in which ground level employees certify the code of ethics 
that discourages such behavior.  
 Further studies could explore how to combat acts of covert sabotage which, according to 
Biccheri’s Model, would be particularly equipped to evade social norms activated by a code of 
ethics because these acts would be unobservable. In addition, because I suspect the findings of this 
study would not generalize to sabotage directed at employers, further research could also explore 
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the effectiveness this and other remedies of stopping sabotage directed at the employer’s company 
rather than his coworkers. Also, subsequent studies could also explore the cause and cures for 
workplace discouragement that was evident in this study.  
 I hope to provide management with insight into how to practically design and implement 
an incentive system. Special care may be needed to protect team members from those who’s 
personality classifies them as inherently resistant to social norms, such as a those who may 
border on schizoid personality disorder (Triebwasser et al. 2012). However, it’s very possible 
that by having employees certify a code of ethics while competing in a tournament might be a 
way for management to get the “best of both worlds”.  
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Appendix A 
I. The Sales Agency’s Responsibilities to the Manufacturer/Principal: 
 To comply with the Principal’s terms and conditions of sale. 
 To conscientiously cover the assigned territory, accounts or industry segment. 
 To avoid any form of misrepresentation. 
 To establish relationships only with those Principals which will be well represented by 
the Sales Agency. 
 To refrain from representing competing lines without written agreement of the Principal. 
 To constantly strive to add value to the relationship between the Principal and the 
Customers. 
II. The Manufacturer’s/Principal’s Responsibilities to the Sales Agency: 
 To enter into a fair, clearly worded, written Sales Representative (Independent 
Contractor) Agreement which addresses the needs, concerns, expectations and objectives 
of both parties. 
 To refrain from modifying the terms of this agreement, except by mutual written consent 
following full discussion of the matter. 
 To recognize the Sales Agency as an important element in the sales goals of the Principal. 
 To constantly strive to support the Sales Agency’s efforts by timely responses and open 
communication. 
III. The Sales Agency’s Responsibilities to the Customer: 
 To promote only those products or services which are in the Customer’s best interest. 
 To constantly strive to improve the relationship between the Principal and the Customer. 
 To clearly and fairly communicate the needs of all parties in the business relationship. 
 To process Customer problems and questions promptly and accurately. 
VI. The Responsibilities of one Sales Agency to Another: 
 To share ideas beneficial to the rep profession. 
 To respect existing Principal relationships of other Sales Agencies. 
 To refrain from using unfair methods to solicit the Customers of another Sales Agency. 
 To cooperate to enhance the professional relationship of the Sales Agency and its 
Principals by supporting MANA, which was established for that purpose; subscribing to 
its aims and objectives, and in every practical way working to advance the marketing 
interests of all Sales Agencies and their Principals. 
https://www.manaonline.org/about/code-of-ethics/ 
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Appendix B: Excerpt from Sabotage Coding Instructions 
 
How to Record Sabotage 
 
Think of the video you are about to watch as taking place on a 12 x 12 square meter canvas (see 
below). There are four avatars on the canvas, each with a 1 x 1 meter colored ink stamp. Each 
avatar can jump to a blank spot on the canvas and color that spot their unique color. Each avatar 
may jump anywhere from ~0.3 to ~1.3 meters. Your job is to record the amount canvas that is 
painted by each avatar that has already been colored by another avatar.   
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Appendix B (continued): Excerpt from Sabotage Coding Instructions 
 
If an avatar paints over an area of the canvas that has previously been colored by another avatar, 
the amount painted is to be recorded as Sabotage. The amount of color that is now gone because 
it has been painted over by a new color is to be recorded as Loss. Please use a chart like the one 
below to keep track of which avatars have sabotaged whom. 
 
For example, in the picture below, the pink avatar (Yoshi) has sabotage a 1x1 meter square area 
that was previously painted by the yellow avatar (DK). 
 
In this case, you would fill in the chart as one square of sabotage for Yoshi and one square of 
loss for DK. 
 
 
You will most likely need to re-watch the videos and focus on only one avatar at a time in order 
to get an accurate measurement. Please code your final recording as a % of the canvas (using the 
conversion chart above) rounded to the nearest percentage point.  
 
